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COLLOQUY
The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt:
A Rational Response to the Critics
Aaron D. Twerski*
The legislative tort reform movement has been successful beyond the
hopes of its most ardent advocates.' Academia was caught napping. The
legislative coup was so quick and ferocious that commentators did not
have time to react.2 Some early scholarly discussion focused on pro-
posed federal product liability legislation.' However, oblivious to the
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth Midrash Elyon
Research Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D. 1965, Mar-
quette University.
From January 1986 to August 1988 some 35 states enacted significant tort reform
legislation. This figure does not include states that passed legislation dealing with in-
surance reform. It also does not include states whose tort reform legislation antedated
January 1986. For compilations of many of the tort reform statutes, see INSURANCE
INFO. INST., DATA BASE REPORTS (1986, 1987); V. SCHWARTZ, P. LEE, F. SOUK &
M. MULLEN, PRODUCT LIABILITY: CASES AND TRENDS (1989); Products Liability
Rep. (CCH); see also T. WILSON, J. ELSER, H. MOSKOWITZ, M. EDELMAN & H.
DICKER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVIEW - 1988 (1988); T. WILSON, J. ELSER, H.
MOSKOWITZ, M. EDELMAN & H. DICKER, U.S. TORT REFORM - 1988 (1988).
2 Many law review symposia have dealt with the general subject of tort law reform.
See, e.g., Symposium: Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 (1987); Symposium
on Developments in Tort Law and Tort Law Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 669 (1987);
Symposium on Tort Reform, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 345 (1987); Symposium, Tort Re-
form: Will It Advance Justice in the Civil System?, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1211 (1987);
Tort Reform Symposium, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987). With some notable ex-
ceptions much of the literature is descriptive, not analytical. More important, the litera-
ture is reactive. It is fair to say that no one foresaw in advance that state legislatures
would act so swiftly and so decisively on such a broad range of tort reform issues.
3 See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product
Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REV. 625 (1978); Johnson, Products
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debate in the nation's capital, state legislatures created their own indi-
vidualized "reform packages."'4 Each piece of legislation, itself, is not
earth shattering, but, in toto, the changes have substantially altered the
law of torts.'
Academic commentary has now begun to surface. It is not surprising
that those who believe systemic reform is necessary are unhappy with
what they perceive as patchwork being performed on the existing sys-
tem.6 Criticism has, however, come from those who believe that the
legislative solutions are both unfair and unwise.7 In last year's U.C.
Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. REV. 677 (1978); Twerski, A
Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas
for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 575 (1985) [hereafter Twerski, Product Liabil-
ity Bill]; Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search of the Best of All
Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411 (1982); Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of
the Uniform Product Liability Law - A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221
(1978-1979).
4 Several states passed product liability legislation in the period 1978-1981. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 6-1401 to -1410 (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-1 to -8
(West 1983 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3301 to -3306 (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 411.200-.470 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). This legislation pre-
ceded most of the federal tort reform activity. These statutes were, however, directed
toward product liability. They did not encompass the kinds of sweeping reform that
characterized legislative efforts in 1986-1988.
The following subjects have been covered in recent tort reform legislation: (1) pro-
duction defect, (2) design defect, (3) failure to warn, (4) express warranty, (5) product
misuse, (6) product alteration, (7) contributory fault, (8) assumption of risk, (9) un-
avoidably dangerous products, (10) inherently dangerous products, (11) compliance
with governmental standards, (12) compliance with industry standards, (13) obvious
dangers, (14) technological feasibility - state of art defenses, (15) liability of wholesal-
ers and retailers, (16) joint and several liability, (17) statutes of limitations, (18) stat-
utes of repose, (19) worker compensation, (20) punitive damages, (21) subsequent re-
medial measures as evidence of defect, (22) economic loss arising from product liability
claims, (23) mitigation of damages for failure to wear a seat belt, (24) collateral source
recovery, (25) caps on recovery for pain and suffering, (26) periodic payment of dam-
ages, (27) attorney contingency fee limitations, (28) prosecution of frivolous suits.
6 See, e.g., P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988); Abel, The Real Tort Crisis - Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443 (1987); Epstein, The Risks of RisklUtility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469 (1987);
O'Connell, Balanced Proposal for Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317
(1987); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987); Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987) [hereafter
Priest, Puzzles]; Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795
(1987); Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 329
(1987).
7 See Habush, Adapted from the Statement of the Association of the Trial Lawyers
of America Before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, 10 HAMLINE
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Davis Law Review, Professor Richard Wright wrote about one of the
major targets of "tort reform" - joint and several tort liability - and
pronounced that the work of the state legislatures in this area was the
product of misunderstanding and outright confusion.'
Professor Wright's critique of the movement to abolish or modify the
common-law joint and several doctrine raises perceptive and troubling
questions about the fairness of the proposed legislative solutions. His
conclusion that state legislatures have acted out of ignorance and confu-
sion is, however, simply insupportable. Professor Wright apparently
believes that no rational legislature that fully appreciated the underly-
ing issues would have enacted statutory reform. Wright is wrong. The
legislators understood very well the policy choices before them and
made some difficult and painful decisions. One may differ with their
policy preference but it is unfair to conclude that they acted as know-
nothings who were the captives of industry lobbyists. They dealt with a
problem of legitimate legislative concern and for the most part re-
sponded with considerable moderation. This Essay's purpose is to voice
the concerns that triggered a massive revision of the hallowed common-
law joint tortfeasor doctrine. To provide for analysis, it is first neces-
sary to restate Professor Wright's views. Only by understanding why
the legislatures rejected the position he advocates can we understand
what fueled the fires that led to such extraordinary legislative action.
I. ATTACKING THE REFORMERS
Professor Wright's attack on the joint tortfeasor reform movement
proceeds from some common-sense assumptions. As between two negli-
gent defendants and an innocent plaintiff, fairness dictates that the de-
fendant who is at fault should bear the cost of the plaintiff's loss when
one of the defendants is insolvent or otherwise immune from liability.9
L. REV. 491 (1987); Kindregan & Swartz, The Assault on the Captive Consumer:
Emasculating the Common Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J.
673 (1987).
8 See Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Princi-
pled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1141 (1988).
9 Id. at 1161-65. For a plaintiff who is contributorily negligent, Wright recognizes
that the claim for reallocating fault to all parties including the plaintiff is stronger. Id.
at 1188-92. Nonetheless, Wright concludes that the reallocation formula of the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act violates corrective justice norms. He argues that the negli-
gence of plaintiffs is different from that of defendants. Plaintiffs have merely exposed
themselves to injury; the defendant tortfeasors thus have no corrective justice claim
against them to offset or to match plaintiffs' corrective justice claim against each
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Any revision of the joint tortfeasor doctrine shifts the loss arising from
a defendant's insolvency to the plaintiff. Wright contends that legisla-
tures have been hoodwinked by industry lobbyists into limiting liability
to a defendant's proportional share of fault. These lobbyists, he adds,
have managed to create a "smokescreen" by propounding several false
and deceptive arguments.
First, industry advocates contend that joint and several liability is
unfair because a defendant is held responsible to pay more than the
proportional share of harm which she caused. Wright argues that in
joint or concurrent tort liability a defendant is only liable if she is the
"but-for" cause of the harm.10 Cause is indivisible, and each defendant
should be held liable for the entire harm because the plaintiff would
have escaped injury absent the fault of each tortfeasor. Wright claims
that legislatures have failed to understand the crucial distinction be-
tween fault apportionment (which is divisible) and causal responsibility
(which is not divisible). As a result, he contends, lawmakers have
avoided facing the hard question about why, between defendants who
are causally responsible for harm and a plaintiff (who is not), the bur-
den of a defendant's insolvency should be carried by the plaintiff.
Second, defense lobbyists argue that tort liability was traditionally
based on moral fault. In a true "fault" system, they say, it was appro-
priate to impose joint and several liability. Modern tort law has weak-
ened or obliterated the fault-based limitation on tort liability. Under
common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine, defendants who "have done noth-
ing wrong" are now called on to provide "social insurance" for harms
caused by others.1 Wright argues that tort liability was never based on
moral fault but rather on moral responsibility for conduct that has ex-
posed others "to a significant, objectively foreseeable, and unaccepted
risk of injury."' 2 Thus, modern extensions of liability (such as strict
products liability) are consistent with traditional notions of tortious
fault. Even if juries, in the absence of sufficient evidence of tortious
behavior, act improperly and impose liability on "deep pocket" defend-
defendant.
The distinction between negligence that is self-regarding and negligence that threat-
ens others is interesting but does not comport with contributory and primary negli-
gence. For the most part, conduct that constitutes contributory negligence not only ex-
poses the plaintiff to harm but also exposes others to harm. Unless Wright is prepared
to distinguish between solely self-regarding contributory fault and contributory fault
that can serve as a predicate for primary negligence, his distinction fails.
10 Id. at 1152-53.
'1 See id. at 1149 n.26.
12 Id. at 1150.
[Vol. 22:11251128
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ants, the solution is to police jury behavior rather than to strike out
against the joint tortfeasor doctrine.
Third, evidence exists that tort judgments against deep pocket de-
fendants are higher than those against other defendants for similar
types of injuries.-3 Modification of the joint and several doctrine is thus
necessary to somewhat curtail excessive jury awards. Wright argues
that judges have the power to remit excessive damages. It is improper
to eliminate the joint tortfeasor doctrine to resolve the problem of exces-
sive damages. 1
4
Professor Wright concludes that the only unfairness existing under
the common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine is that solvent defendants
often bear a disproportionate burden because their contribution actions
are ineffective against insolvent defendants.15 However, it is far less eq-
uitable to ask the innocent plaintiff to bear the loss. Other common-law
countries such as England retain joint and several liability and do so
even though they have adopted rules of comparative responsibility.
Wright expresses the hope that after the "tort reform" frenzy has dissi-
pated, legislatures will restore joint and several liability to its rightful
place.' 6
II. CAUSATION AND FAULT - WERE THE LEGISLATURES
CONFUSED?
Professor Wright's thesis is engaging but incorrect. State legislatures
were not confused between fault and causation. The issue of who
should bear the loss caused by an insolvent defendant - an innocent
plaintiff or a faulty defendant - was not ignored or confused. It was
See Kelley & Beyler, Large Damage Awards and the Insurance Crisis: Causes,
Effects and Cures, 75 ILL. B.J. 140, 146-54 (1986). A recent study of insurance files
by ISO Data, Inc., contains figures that are relevant to the issue under discussion. See
ISO DATA, INC., CLAIMS FILE DATA ANALYSIS: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF STUDY
RESULTS (1988). In Part I of its study ISO investigated claims of $25,000 or more -
whether open or closed - arising from policies written during 1983. The study found
that in multi-defendant cases the insurance mechanism paid 2.4 times the amount paid
in single defendant cases. Id. at 8, 30. In Part II of the study ISO investigated claims
that closed in the first week of August 1987 regardless of amount. In this category, the
amount paid in multi-defendant cases was 3.7 times that paid in single defendant cases.
Id. The authors of the report are careful to demonstrate that multi-defendant cases
often involve more serious injuries than single defendant cases. Id. at 30. Nonetheless,
the disparities are so significant that the results in multi-defendant cases are likely
affected by the defendant's status.
14 See Wright, supra note 8, at 1152.
Is See id. at 1162.
16 See id. at 1193.
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not simply one issue among many which legislatures discussed. It is fair
to say that it was the only subject that weighed on the legislators'
minds. Having testified before several legislative committees to modify
the common-law doctrine, I can unequivocally say that the issue of
"fairness" to plaintiffs was constantly and unremittingly questioned. 17
Professor Wright believes that industry lobbyists' argument that liabil-
ity should not exceed proportional fault successfully diverted attention
from causation. That statement does not accurately describe the debate.
Industry lobbyists did argue that it was unfair to subject a defendant
to liability exceeding the defendant's proportional fault share. 8 This
argument was countered by consumer advocates and members of the
trial bar who propounded the "fairness" argument. They argued that a
defendant who was causally responsible, rather than the innocent
plaintiff, should bear the loss.'9 Proof that legislatures understood this
17 See, e.g., Product Liability (Part I), Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1987) [hereafter House Energy Committee Hear-
ings]; id. at 368-74 (statement of Professor David Randolph Smith); id. at 385-87
(article of John W. Wade); id. at 396-97 (article of Jerry J. Phillips); id. at 427, 433
(colloquy with Professor Smith); id. at 459-60, 463-64 (statement of Gene
Kimmelman); id. at 469-73 (colloquy of Congressman Dingell with members of panel);
id. at 474-75 (colloquy between Congressman Florio and Professor Twerski); id. at
484, 496-501 (colloquy between congressmen and panel); id. at 398 (article of David
Randolph Smith & John W. Wade).
18 Id. at 456-59 (statement of Alfred W. Cortese, Jr.); see COMMISSION TO Ex-
AMINE PROBLEMS OF TORT LITIGATION AND LIABILITY INSURANCE IN MAINE,
DRAFT REPORT 96-97 (October 1, 1987) (expressing minority view); MAINE LIABIL-
ITY CRISIS ALLIANCE, RESPONSE TO DRAFT OF COMM. TO EXAMINE PROBLEMS OF
TORT LITIGATION AND LIABILITY INSURANCE IN MAINE app. B (1987) ("Joint and
Several Liability") (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review); see also SPECIAL TASK
FORCE ON PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE, OFFICE OF WISCONSIN COMM. OF
INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT 17-19 (August 1986) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law
Review).
19 House Energy Committee Hearings, supra note 17; see MAINE TRIAL LAWYERS
ASS'N, MAINE HAS AN INSURANCE PROBLEM - NOT A JURY PROBLEM 38-43 (1988)
(copy on file with U. C. Davis Law Review); Protecting the Innocent Victim: Joint and
Several Liability, Hearings Before the Comm. on Economic Dev. of Texas State Senate
(Mar. 2, 1987) (statement of Professor Thomas 0. McGarity, University of Texas,
Austin, School of Law) (copy on file with U.C. Davis Law Review); id. at 1-4 (state-
ment by law firm of Kidd, Whitehurst, Harkness and Watson) (copy on file with U.C.
Davis Law Review); id. at 6-8 (Mar. 5, 1987) (statement of Joan Claybrook) (copy on
file with U.C. Davis Law Review); Nevada Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 1987 Press Packet,
Statement on Joint and Several Liability 3 (1987); see also NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST Toxic HAZARDS AND THE TEXAS CENTER FOR RURAL STUDIES, THE
ROLE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY IN ToxIcs COMPENSATION AND PREVEN-
[Vol. 22:11251130
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point is that most did not abolish outright the common-law doctrine.20
Instead, legislatures enacted a wide variety of legislative solutions that
balanced the equities in differing ways. 21 The lawmakers understood
TION (Feb. 6, 1987).
It is difficult if not impossible to gather the hundreds of statements various interest
groups made to state legislative bodies. These materials are not systematically published
or gathered. The materials set forth supra notes 17-19, however, illustrate that in the
legislative debate to modify the joint tortfeasor doctrine, the argument for fairness to
innocent plaintiffs was made with considerable force and vigor.
20 Of 34 states that have somewhat modified the common-law joint tortfeasor doc-
trine, only nine have abolished joint tortfeasor liability for both economic and
noneconomic losses. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-111.5 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
33-4 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-258a(d) (Supp. 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-02-03 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40
(1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1988); Wvo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1987).
Two total abolition states allow joint liability if the fault of the tortfeasor exceeds 50%.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2)
(1988). Two other states provide that if the fault of any defendant is less than 50%,
that defendant cannot be liable for more than twice the fault allocated to her. ALASKA
STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (1987); 1987 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-15.1-.2 (Supp.
1987). For a comprehensive review of the statutes enacted as of the date of this Article,
see Pressler & Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 DEN.
U.L. REV. 651, 656-59 (1987).
21 A good number of states have only eliminated the joint tortfeasor doctrine for
noneconomic loss (i.e., pain and suffering). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 to 1431.5
(West Supp. 1988) (added by Proposition 51, approved by electorate on June 3, 1986);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 2, para. 117 (1989)
(defendant over 25% at fault is jointly and severally liable); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
1600 (McKinney 1986) (defendant over 50% at fault is jointly and severally liable);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2515.19 (Anderson 1987) (applies only when plaintiff is at
fault).
A recently enacted New Jersey statute sets forth an interesting compromise. The
statute states:
Except as provided in subsection d. of this section, the party so recovering
may recover as follows:
a. The full amount of the damages from any party determined by the
trier of fact to be 60% or more responsible for total damages.
b. The full amount of economic damages plus the percentage of non-
economic damages directly attributable to that party's negligence from
any party determined by the trier of fact to be more than 20% but less
that 60% responsible for the total damages.
c. Only that percentage of the damages directly attributable to that
party's negligence from any party determined by the trier of fact to be
20% or less responsible for the total damages.
d. With regard to environmental tort actions, the party so recovering
may recover the full amount of the damage award from any party
determined to be liable.
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the underlying tensions and sought to resolve them to comport with
their sense of justice and with their sense of appropriate balance in a
tort compensation system.
One then questions why the legislatures, who (according to my anal-
ysis) fully understood the issue, modified the joint tortfeasor doctrine?
Why were they not convinced by the simplicity and strength of the
"fairness" argument?
I am convinced that legislatures were driven by at least two consider-
ations. First, they believed that the joint tortfeasor doctrine operated to
overlay tort doctrine that was itself unfair. Joint tortfeasor liability ex-
ponentially multiplies the unfairness. On finding themselves unable to
address many of the underlying problems because political resolution of
fundamental liability issues was not feasible, they determined to reduce
the unfairness fostered by existing doctrine to manageable proportions.
Second, legislatures understood that the problem was more serious than
merely reallocating losses from occasional insolvent defendants who
were unable to pay their fair share of judgments.
The true problem is "institutionally immune" defendants. These de-
fendants have been granted a broad license to act, bearing limited fi-
nancial responsibility for their conduct. It is not surprising for legisla-
tures to conclude that it is unfair to saddle solvent defendants with the
full brunt of damages substantially caused by conduct which society
e. Any party who is compelled to pay more than his percentage share,
may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (amended 1987).
Several states have followed the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and have enacted
reallocation statutes which reallocate uncollectible shares among all the responsible par-
ties, including the plaintiff if the plaintiff were negligent. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 604.02 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.067, 538.230, 538.300 (Vernon
1988). Michigan applies its reallocation statute only if the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. See MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987).
Professor Wright attributes the "confused results" of the legislative activity to "the
confused and distorted nature of the debate which the defense advocates have fostered."
Wright, supra note 8, at 1168. He could not be more wrong. The varying legislative
results reflect the very real tensions legislators correctly perceive to be operating. So-
phisticated and thoughtful commentators who have supported legislative compromise
have been troubled by these same tensions. See, e.g., Mooney, The Liability Crisis - A
Perspective, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1235, 1260-61 (1987); Rabin, Some Reflections on the
Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 13, 40-41 (1988); Trebilcock, The
Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A
Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929,
959-60 (1987); Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps
on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
628 (1988).
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immunized. The decision against joint tortfeasor liability essentially
states society's belief that the limited compensation available from re-
covery-immune defendants reflects the appropriate level of compensa-
tion for the immune conduct. For example, motorists who are permitted
by law to drive with woefully inadequate liability insurance limits are
not simply insolvent tortfeasors. Instead, they are recovery-immune de-
fendants, legally sanctioned to drive with full knowledge that they will
only be able to pay a small fraction of the costs of the harm they cause.
To shift losses to the solvent joint tortfeasor is to treat him as a "whip-
ping boy" and to require him to bear full responsibility for broad-based
immunities that cut a very large swath through traditional tort liability.
III. JOINT TORTFEASOR LIABILITY AND FAULT BASED LIABILITY
A. Doctrinal Developments
Professor Wright has sharply criticized reformers for arguing that
joint and several tort liability operates unfairly in the context of the
modern extensions of tort liability. He says that moral responsibility,
not moral fault, is the criterion for imposing tort liability. 22 The elabo-
rate expansion of liability over the last two decades does not reflect the
imposition of "social insurance" on innocent parties but rather is the
consequence of applying the "moral responsibility" principle to new
societal problems.
Professor Wright is entitled to his view. It is not shared by a sub-
stantial body of scholars who view the expansive developments in prod-
ucts liability and medical malpractice as a radical departure from tradi-
tional tort fault principles. 23 Legislatures that sought to put their finger
in the dike found the task extraordinarily complex. Not only was it
difficult to forge political compromise on doctrinal issues, but they also
found legislative drafting on these issues to be most troublesome. For
every word or phrase chosen to resolve a given problem one could de-
velop a hypothetical for which the proposed legislative resolution might
well be inappropriate. The common law of torts is not easily com-
pressed into tight legislative language. Legislatures perceived them-
selves caught in a trap created by the courts. The doctrinal structure of
the liability system was marvelously resistant to serious legislative
22 Wright, supra note 8, at 1150.
23 Several leading scholars have taken the position that the tort revolution over the
past three decades reflects serious departures from traditional tort principles. See, e.g.,
R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); P. HUBER, supra note 6;
Epstein, supra note 6, at 469; Priest, Puzzles, supra note 6, at 1534-39.
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invasion.
Proponents premise the belief that expansive tort liability has taken
on an "insurance" like character on the confluence of multiple factors.
It is not based, as Wright suggests, on the simple failure to understand
the difference between "moral fault" and "moral responsibility." First,
liability rules have taken on a hue that raises real questions about
whether a defendant bears "moral responsibility" for injury. Second, a
host of satellite rules that traditionally limited tort liability have been
almost abolished. Third, the very nature of complex technological liti-
gation has raised serious questions about the judiciary's ability to fairly
adjudicate issues brought before them.
As to the formal structure of the liability rules, one reasonably dis-
cerns a move from "moral responsibility" toward pure "insurance." In
products liability the imposition in several important jurisdictions of li-
ability for scientifically unknowable risks or for designs that conform to
the existing state-of-art at the time of product distribution 24 is hardly
consistent with any common-sense notion of "moral responsibility." A
test that imposes liability for failing to account for risk information
which was not knowable or technology which was not feasible ten or
twenty years earlier when the product was marketed strikes many as
radically different from traditional strict liability.2 In many jurisdic-
24 The leading case imposing liability for scientifically unknowable risks is Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Beshada was
substantially modified by Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374
(1984). Although Feldman establishes an ex ante negligence test for liability, it shifts
the burden of proof to the defendant on the issue of scientific liability. In many in-
stances, this is the functional equivalent of a true strict liability test. Recent legislation
in New Jersey, which enacted a "state-of-art" defense, appears to apply to only design
defect cases. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-58C-1.3(a)(1) (West 1987). A subsequent sec-
tion of the bill which deals with failure to warn does not limit liability to dangers
which were foreseeable at the time the product was distributed. Id. § 2A-58C-1.4. The
court in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978), shifts the burden of proof on the risk/utility issue to the defendant. It is not
totally clear whether it imposes a true hindsight test for scientifically unknowable risks,
although it appears to do so. There is substantial judicial support for true strict liability
in which defendant's foreseeable knowledge is not a mitigating factor. See, e.g., Dart v.
Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d
273 (1984); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 346 Pa. Super. 95, 499 A.2d 326 (1985).
25 See, e.g., Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 919, 952-68 (1981); Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 689 (1985); Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavail-
able Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983).
1134 [Vol. 22:1125
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tions the judicial test for "defect" has become so open-ended that little
more than insurance seems to be the criterion for imposing liability.
For example, adopting an unlimited "consumer expectation" test2 6 or
"the manufacturer is the guarantor of the product safety" 27 rule ap-
pears to impose liability even though the manufacturer has met risk-
utility norms. Furthermore, the total merger of assumption of the risk
26 A fair number of courts have couched their tests for defect in whole or in part in
terms of "consumer expectations." See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d
442 (10th Cir. 1976); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981); Vineyard v. Empire Mach.
Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1978); Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d
443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225; Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978);
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 641 P.2d 353 (1982); Suter v. San Angelo
Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983); Leichtamer v. Amer-
ican Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981); Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 373
A.2d 505 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774
(1975); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326,
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
Although the consumer expectation test has its academic supporters, see, e.g., Shapo,
A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal
Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1974), it has been heavily
criticized by other commentators. See, e.g., Keeton, Products Liability - Design
Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 310 (1979); Schwartz,
Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 476 n.241
(1979); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of
Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861, 916-18
(1983). For a rather shocking example of open-ended liability utilizing the consumer
expectation test, see Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224,
184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982). This Author's critique of the case is found in Twerski,
Product Liability Bill, supra note 3, at 580-86. One should be careful to distinguish
recent legislation that exempts manufacturers from liability for common products that
meet consumer expectations. These bills serve to extinguish liability for commonly used
products that have inherent dangers. They do not serve as vehicles for open-ended lia-
bility. See, e.g., CALIF. CIv. CODE § 1714.45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-1.3(a)(2) (1987).
See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027 (1978).
Azzarello has been treated harshly by most commentators. See Birnbaum, Unmasking
the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negli-
gence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636-39 (1980); Henderson, Products Liability: Contro-
versial New Decision on Design Defects, 2 CORP. L. REV. 246, 248 (1979); Comment,
Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect Litigation in Pennsylvania: A Critique of
Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, 89 DICK. L. REV. 149 (1984); Note, Products
Liability - Restatement (Second) of Torts - Section 402A - Uncertain Standards
of Responsibility in Design Defect Cases - After Azzarello, Will Manufacturers Be
Absolutely Liable in Pennsylvania?, 24 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (1979).
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into the doctrine of comparative fault has imposed substantial liability
on defendants for risk-taking conduct which was once perceived to be
the plaintiff's "moral responsibility. ' '2 Finally, annihilating almost all
of the limited-duty rules has removed structural certainty from the law
of torts.29 Clear structural guidelines played an important role in as-
signing "moral responsibility" among various actors. In a world in
which everyone is responsible, it is excruciatingly difficult to pinpoint
moral responsibility.
The formal changes in liability rules do not tell half the tale.
Significant changes have taken place in administrating other elements
of the tort cause of action. The amount of evidence necessary to estab-
lish cause-in-fact has substantially been diminished.30 Cases go to juries
with evidence that is very thin, and courts are hard pressed to overturn
verdicts based on the weight of the evidence. Some jurisdictions have
even shifted the burden of proof on causation-related issues to the de-
28 See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc, 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
This case was the first to abolish implied assumption of risk as an independent defense.
The widespread adoption of comparative fault has hastened the process considerably.
See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 495-96 (5th ed. 1984); V.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.4, at 165-72 (2d ed. 1986); H. WOODS,
COMPARATIVE FAULT § 6, at 131-64 (2d ed. 1987) (listing 35 states that have merged
assumption of risk into comparative fault).
2 A host of limited-duty rules have been either abolished or sharply curtailed. (1)
Landowner liability rules. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Basso
v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). See generally W.
PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 28, § 62. (2) Recovery for negligent infliction of
mental distress without physical injury. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal.
3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets,
Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 438 (Me. 1982). (3) Bystander recovery for mental distress due to
injury caused to a third person. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). (4) Patent
danger rule in products liability. See Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348
N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). (5) Product misuse defense. See Hughes v.
Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 1980).
30 See McNabb v. Green Real Estate Co., 62 Mich. App. 500, 519, 233 N.W.2d
811, 820 (1975); Henderson, The Role of the Judge in Tort Law: Why Creative Judg-
ing Won't Save the Products Liability System, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 845, 852 (1983)
(citing the tendency of courts "to play fast and loose with the [causation] require-
ment"); Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 713 n.89 (1986) ("As a
practical matter, by allowing jurors to infer causation from the facts, a court may tac-
itly shift the burden to the defendant to 'disprove' causation."); see also The Need for
Legislative Reform of the Tort System: A Report on the Liability Crisis from Affected
Organizations, 10 HAMLINE L. REV. 345, 363 (1987).
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fendant so that it is increasingly difficult for the defendant to prevail."
Furthermore, courts have been so lax in administering doctrines of
proximate cause,32 intervening cause, 33 and shifting duty,34 that they
provide little of the traditional protection that existed in the regime of
"moral responsibility" liability.
Finally, respected scholars have argued that complex technological
design-defect litigation involves the courts in decision making that seri-
ously strains their abilities to fairly adjudicate issues.35 The highly
31 In product liability "failure to warn" cases, courts have created a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a warning, if given, would have been heeded. The cause-in-fact issue is
rarely resolved in favor of defendant. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories,
666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987); Hamilton v. Hardy, 370 Colo. 375, 549 P.2d 1099
(1976); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541
(1979); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 681 P.2d 1038, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423
N.E.2d 831 (1981); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla.
1974); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972) But see Plummer
v. Lederle Laboratories, 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 232 (1987)
(finding no evidence that physician would have warned patient of risk of contracting
polio from vaccine - thus no proximate cause as a matter of law); Bloxom v. Bloxom,
512 So. 2d 839 (La. 1987) (finding that failure to adequately warn in driver manual
about intense heat emanating from catalytic converter was not cause of fire because
owner said he never read the manual - presumption of causation rebutted).
A similar phenomenon has arisen in second collision crashworthiness cases. A major-
ity of courts have shifted the burden of proof to the auto manufacturer to establish the
extent of the second collision damages. If they fail to do so, they are treated as joint
tortfeasors with the primary wrongdoers and held fully liable for all damages to the
plaintiff. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 107
Idaho 701, 692 P.2d 345 (1984).
32 See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 665 P.2d 947, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 857 (1983); Wierum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468 (1975).
11 See, e.g., O'Toole v. Carlsbad Shell Serv. Station, 202 Cal. App. 3d 151, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 663 (1988); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975).
4 See, e.g., Bilota v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984); Lopez v. Precision
Papers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 667, 484 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1985), affd, 67 N.Y.2d 871, 492
N.E.2d 1214, 501 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1986).
35 An early critic of open-ended design defect litigation noted that the polycentric
nature of this genre of product liability claim was substantially different from tradi-
tional tort litigation. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious De-
sign Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). Professor
Henderson continues to believe that justiciability concerns place significant limitations
on tort doctrine. See Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
901 (1982). This Author has also expressed deep concern about the unstructured na-
ture of design litigation. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and
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polycentric and interwoven issues that courts must balance and compro-
mise to determine whether a design is defective may render them non-
justiciable. Failure to warn litigation also presents serious justiciability
problems.3 6 It takes little to conjure up after the fact a specific warning
that might have been useful. If courts relax causation norms as well,
this form of litigation may result in liability that nearly transforms
manufacturers into insurers.
When all of the above factors are combined, ample grounds exist to
conclude that we have moved rather far away from the "moral respon-
sibility" which once governed our tort system. What does this have to
do with joint tortfeasor liability? If the critics are (or are even partially)
correct and defendants are in fact "insurers," then good reason exists to
balk at their being full insurers when their involvement in the injury
event has been shared with others. If they are liable for being actors
rather than truly at fault in the traditional sense (as they were when
joint tortfeasor liability was first adopted), then why should they carry
the full weight of liability? They bristle at any liability and are right-
fully incensed when asked to carry the entire cost of the accident.
Wright's argument to this is to reform the offensive doctrines rather
than attack joint tortfeasor liability. He is of course quite correct.
However, as noted earlier, the law of torts is remarkably resistant to
comprehensive doctrinal change. 8 The problems I catalogued are so
complex and their effects so serious, that legislative reform to reduce
the perceived unfairness was compelling. Legislatures thus sought to
limit the unfairness by restricting the plaintiff's right to recover to the
percentage of fault attributed to the defendant. If the substantive harms
could not easily be undone, they could at least be reduced by instituting
procedural rules that kept them in check. Equitable apportionment ac-
cording to party fault (especially when applied to noneconomic loss) is
Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the
Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
36 See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987) (vacating sum-
mary judgment for defendant when claim was that brewery failed to warn about possi-
ble danger of contracting pancreatitis because of habitual beer drinking); Fraust v.
Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (denying defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment in case in which mother of a 16-month-old infant might not have
known of risk of feeding him peanut butter sandwich; child choked on the peanut but-
ter and suffered severe brain damage; a jury might find that the manufacturer breached
its duty to warn of hidden dangers).
17 Wright, supra note 8, at 1151.
3 Rabin, supra note 21, at 39, has also observed that substantive law reform is an
unlikely prospect. Tort reformers have thus focused on damage-related issues to curb
excesses in the tort compensation system.
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a sensible and moderate legislative response to an otherwise intractable
problem.
B. The Jury and the Ten Percent Solution
Improvident doctrine and complex process concerns are just some of
the problems faced by institutional defendants. The problem of jury
control for cases in which the jury must evaluate expert testimony and
balance the risk-utility factors to determine liability is at very best
daunting. Given a constitutional right to jury trial and severe limita-
tions on the judge's right to direct a verdict when legitimate fact ques-
tions need to be decided, institutional defendants believe that the mech-
anisms to thwart improper jury verdicts are simply not operative.39
For example, they argue with considerable justification that a ten
percent finding of fault in a multi-defendant case is not particularly
difficult to obtain. Juries, they say, parcel out small portions of liability
without significant evidence to support the verdict, and appellate courts
are close to impotent if they wish to reverse. The evidence may be just
enough to squeak by, and once the plaintiff passes the most minimal of
thresholds, the defendant under common-law doctrine is liable for full
damages. Municipalities, corporations, and major institutions stand as
the defendant of last resort.4
The implication of this for settlement is rather obvious. An institu-
tional defendant that believes it has a fully defensible case must think
long and hard whether it can take the chance of litigating its innocence.
The spectre of ten percent liability is enough to thwart defendants with
strong and legitimate defenses from engaging in litigation. For no lia-
bility may turn out to be ten percent liability, and ten percent effec-
tively means 100% under the common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine. It is
also not certain that the desperate search for the deep pocket will force
a quick and easy (if extortionate) settlement. Claimants presented with
the opportunity to "shoot for the moon" on the basis of a defendant's
minuscule fault may resist sensible settlement. Thus, litigation may be
19 In a leading case, Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), the court exhaustively reviewed the evidence of design
defect in a crashworthiness setting. Given the complexity of balancing the risk/utility
factors, the court indicated that its hands were tied. The seventh amendment barred
appellate review of facts found by a jury in actions at common law. A jury reversal
could not be sustained unless the record was "critically deficient of that minimum
quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief ... ." Id. at 959.
4 See J. HENDERSON & A. TWERSKI, PRODucTs LIABILITY, PROBLEMS AND
PRocass 331-33 (1987).
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increased and the controversy extended over time. In short, uncertainty
and lack of predictability are added to a litigation system which already
suffers from a lack of stability.
Professor Wright is once again partially correct when he states that
the real problem is not joint liability but any liability. 41 Courts should
really police juries, but their ability to do so is seriously circumscribed.
It is also psychologically very difficult for a court to proclaim that ten
percent liability does not exist. One rather easily understands why pro-
posals to impose joint and several liability only after reaching minimum
thresholds have met with such wide approval.4 2 These proposals are the
only realistic protection against disastrous and unfair liability. More
important, they insure that a defendant's right to mount a credible de-
fense is more than a mere formality.
C. Damages - Compounding the Problem: Unregulated Damages
and Deep Pocket Defendants
In addition to liability-related issues, the common-law joint tortfeasor
doctrine compounds unfairness when it assesses unprincipled damages.
The problem again is that a defendant who is assessed a moderate per-
centage of fault finds itself carrying the full weight of exceedingly high
noneconomic loss damages. For the third time I find myself agreeing
with Professor Wright that rational control of damages is a good in and
of itself.43 Joint tortfeasor doctrine should not be the vehicle for dealing
with this problem.
The difficulties are twofold. First, no objective criteria exist for as-
sessing or reviewing awards of noneconomic damages." Judicial control
of this highly volatile category of damages is consequently erratic. Sec-
ond, institutional defendants tend to be the object of jury scorn.41
Wright argues that courts have the power of remittitur and in fact ex-
ercise it." There is thus no need to curb joint tortfeasor liability to
overcome jury overzealousness. Once again, however, Professor Wright
has not heeded the structural weaknesses which permit overinflated
damages to exist as a permanent feature of our tort compensation
system.
The history of appellate review of damages is not shrouded in mys-
41 Wright, supra note 8, at 1151.
42 See statutes cited supra note 21.
43 Wright, supra note 8, at 1152.
" See infra text accompanying notes 48-61.
45 See supra note 13.
46 Wright, supra note 8, at 1152.
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tery. In an unbroken chain of cases beginning in 1812 with the famous
opinion of Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Southwick,47 courts have ac-
knowledged that they have no standards by which to measure or to
evaluate excess damages. The language of Chancellor Kent so often
quoted throughout almost two centuries is remarkable for its lucidity
and its honesty. He stated:
The law has not laid down what shall be the measure of damages in ac-
tions of tort. The measure is vague and uncertain depending upon a vast
variety of causes, facts and circumstances .... The court cannot interfere,
unless the damages are apparent, so that they can properly judge the de-
gree of the injury. Generally, in such cases, they cannot say whether 500
pounds was too much, or 50 pounds would have been too little. The dam-
ages therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as
being, beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as
manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality,
prejudice or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outra-
geous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line;for
they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.48
Over the years courts have utilized different verbalizations to support
findings of excessive damages. Some courts have cited jury "partiality
or prejudice, ' 49 others have cited "caprice," 50 and some courts have
characterized excessive verdicts as "outrageous,' 5 1 and "perverse. '5 2
However, authorities almost unanimously agree that these verbaliza-
tions are the defendant's only protection against an inflated verdict. As
the court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Withers53 noted:
The settled rule is that as there is no legal measure of damages in cases
involving personal injuries, the verdict of the jury in such cases cannot be
set aside as excessive unless it is made to appear that the jury has been
actuated by prejudice, partiality or corruption, or that they have been mis-
led by some mistaken view of the merits of the case .... 4
A paucity of scholarly literature exists dealing with suitable criteria
for measuring damages in noneconomic loss cases. However, the lead-
ing scholars who have written on the subject are astonished that a topic
of such enormous practical significance has no discernable standards or
47 9 Johns. 45 (N.Y. 1812).
48 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
49 Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Howarth, 73 Ind. App. 454, 124 N.E. 687 (1919).
50 Ferry Cos. v. White, 99 Tenn. 256, 41 S.W. 583 (1897).
S Colorado Springs & Interurban R.R. v. Kelley, 65 Colo. 246, 176 P. 307 (1918).
52 Olson v. Brown, 186 Wis. 179, 202 N.W. 167 (1925).
53 192 Va. 493, 65 S.E.2d 654 (1951).
14 Id. at 510, 65 S.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
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guidelines. 55 In 1935 McCormick noted: "Translating pain and anguish
into dollars can, at best be only an arbitrary allowance, and not a pro-
cess of measurement and consequently the judge can, in his instruc-
tions, give the jury no standard to go by."'5 6 Another scholar who stud-
ied pain and suffering damages commented that recovery "leads to
unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary awards .... [There is] no rhyme
or reason underlying the amounts recovered by or denied to
plaintiffs. '5 7
Our tort compensation system transfers billions of dollars every year
based on legal standards which would not be respected in any other
area of the law.58 Professor Wright notes that other common-law coun-
tries continue to impose joint and several tort liability,59 but he fails to
indicate that pain and suffering awards are minuscule compared to
American standards. 60 Their joint and several rules are, in truth, com-
parable to the law of those jurisdictions which allow joint and several
55 See, e.g., Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1953) ("Judges consign [damages for pain and suffer-
ing] uneasily to juries with a minimum of guidance, occasionally observing loosely that
there are no rules for assessing damages in personal injury cases."); Plant, Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 200, 205 ("The complete lack of any such
standard [for measuring damages attributable to pain and suffering] has been freely
admitted by scholars and courts for many years.").
56 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 318 (1935).
17 Zelermyer, Damages For Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 28
(1954).
58 The Author is reminded of Justice Jackson's famous dissent in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 311 (1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In commenting on the
court's decision recognizing the domicile of one spouse as sufficient to assert jurisdiction
over the marriage res without asserting in personam jurisdiction over the absent spouse,
Justice Jackson said: "In other words, settled family relationships may be destroyed by
a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to collect a grocery bill."
Id. at 316. The total absence of standards to assess damages for noneconomic loss
would, I believe, not be countenanced in any other field of substantive law. Billions of
dollars are transferred every year under guidelines that would be considered woefully
inadequate if the issue were the collection of a grocery bill.
19 Wright, supra note 8, at 1183-85.
60 Pain and suffering damages in Canada, for example, are limited to $100,000 (in-
flation-indexed). For a discussion of the impact of this judicially imposed ceiling, see
Trebilcock, The Social Insurance Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A
Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929,
979-81 (1987). Although England has no formal ceilings on pain and suffering, the
amounts awarded are minuscule by American standards. See J. FLEMING, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 125-29 (1985); D. HARRIS, COMPENSATION AND
SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 85-91 (1984); W.Y.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND
JOLOWICZ ON TORTS 628-30 (1984).
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liability for economic losses and several liability only for noneconomic
losses."' When one adds the inherent prejudice toward corporate de-
fendants to a damage award policy which is almost totally without
standards, defendants can justifiably believe that they are not being
fairly dealt with.
The common-law joint and several tortfeasor doctrine accentuates
and exacerbates all the imperfections that exist in the present tort com-
pensation system. Comprehensive and thoroughgoing reform of tort
doctrine and all its accompanying procedural rules is not practically
feasible. One can reasonably believe that only sharply focused and well-
defined legislation can establish the kind of change that courts can ef-
fectively implement. That state legislatures sought to remove the harsh-
ness of full joint liability is fully understandable. The compromise leg-
islative solutions are eloquent testimony that the lawmakers seriously
grappled with the problem.
IV. JOINT TORTFEASOR LIABILITY AND THE INSTITUTIONALLY
IMMUNE DEFENDANT
The language of the joint and several debate is studded with refer-
ences to the insolvent defendant. Although this defendant may exist in
theory, it is not the culprit that has caused all the difficulty.
Consider the following examples:62
(1) A reckless driver loses control of her car and crosses the median strip
hitting the plaintiff's car head on. Following the accident, plaintiff
seeks to establish that the brakes of the defendant's car were defective
and that had they been sound, the accident could have been avoided.
The defendant driver carries 10,000/20,000 automobile liability
insurance.
(2) An employee working on a plastic molding machine injures her hand
when a platen accidentally closes. Plaintiff alleges that the plastic
molding machine should have been equipped with a safety device.
The evidence demonstrates that the safety device which came with
the machine was removed for repairs six months ago. It was never
replaced because the employer believed that the machine would oper-
ate more quickly (and provide for greater productivity) without the
safety device. The employer is not liable in tort because its liability is
limited to worker's compensation.
(3) An aircraft manufacturer is sued following an accident for failing to
design a redundancy system into the aircraft. Evidence indicates that
the cause of the crash was negligent repair of the aircraft by a local
aircraft repair outfit. The repairer carries no insurance and has no
61 See statutes cited supra note 21.
62 See House Energy Committee Hearings, supra note 17, at 442-43.
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significant assets.
In all of the foregoing examples the primary defendants are effec-
tively immune from tort liability. The legislature was fully aware that
drivers with substantial assets carry high limits to protect their wealth.
Minimum liability limits are, in fact, maximum recovery amounts.
Worker's compensation similarly immunizes employers and holds them
liable only to the limits of this specialized compensation system. In ad-
dition, when states permit high risk repairers to operate with thin capi-
talization and no insurance, they effectively immunize these defendants
from liability. These are the "insolvent" defendants who purvey harm
in joint tortfeasor situations.
Legislatures are now considering whether they wish to fully transfer
the cost of these broad-based immunities to the joint tortfeasor who ap-
peared on the scene and who contributed in some small measure to the
accident. The alternative is to spread the broad-based legislative immu-
nity to society as a whole. That they have opted for wider sharing is
not irrational. Which sharing formula is more just is a matter of legiti-
mate difference of opinion. This issue is classic grist for the legislative
mill. However, the legislative decision to remove the immune conduct
from the tort compensation system is evidence that the cost of broad-
based immunity should not be fully borne by the joint tortfeasor. The
reformers have decided that the wide societal implications of the immu-
nities cannot be set aside by mouthing a simple but-for argument
against the solvent defendant. She, too, is an intended beneficiary of the
sweeping immunities. I would add only the following observations. To
shift the full cost of injury to third-party defendants may prevent care-
ful re-examination of the immunities. The present situation which
shifts losses from immune parties to third-party defendants does not
properly internalize costs. 63 As long as third-party recovery serves as an
escape valve allowing recovery from marginally guilty defendants, there
will be less pressure to examine the scope of the immunities and their
sensible limits. Furthermore, third-party liability cases have created a
body of case law that is at best strained and at worst completely irra-
tional.64 The immunities have thus placed unconscionable pressure on
63 Parties who are either wholly or partially immune simply do not have the proper
incentives to modify their behavior.
See Gallub, Limiting the Manufacturer's Duty for Subsequent Product Altera-
tion: Three Steps to a Rational Approach, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 361 (1988) (collecting
and analyzing a large number of third-party manufacturer product liability cases).
That these cases present a significant strain on the system has long been recognized. See
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 112, 44 Fed. Reg. 62713 (1979).
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substantive law doctrines which govern third-party litigation. Society
should honestly confront the tort immunities and reasonably decide
their scope. Joint tortfeasor liability cannot in the long run carry the
load of the tort immunity doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Professor Wright has honed the issues of the joint and several
tortfeasor liability debate. The formal structure of his arguments can-
not be assailed. However, logic does not fully address the underlying
problems. Years of bitter experience with an imperfect liability system
have taught the players that the common-law joint tortfeasor doctrine
operates with considerable unfairness. The various legislative schemes
address that unfairness. My own sense is that the more moderate stat-
utes are not half-bad.

